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In 2026, Western drugmakers stopped debating whether Chinese science is good enough and started paying for it at a scale nobody predicted. China-based drugmakers struck out-licensing agreements worth just over $139 billion in the year to mid-October 2026, according to data provider PharmCube cited by Reuters — already beating the full-year 2025 record. The average agreement this year is worth nearly $700 million, more than ten times the 2018 figure. The money is flowing to three places above all: cancer, obesity and metabolic disease, and autoimmune conditions. And it is flowing through a new deal structure, the “NewCo,” in which the Chinese innovator keeps a stake in a freshly formed overseas company instead of simply handing over the rights.
At the same time, Washington is moving in the opposite direction. The BIOSECURE Act became law on December 18, 2025, as Section 851 of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. It will restrict US federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from designated “biotechnology companies of concern” — but it names no companies, and its prohibitions do not take effect until well after the implementing rules are written, expected around mid-2028. The boom and the backlash are both real, and they are both still unfolding. This article follows the money first, then the friction.
This article explains what the licensing data and the law say about China’s biotech sector. It is not investment advice and not medical advice. Deal values are potential totals — upfront payments plus milestones and royalties that depend on future success — not cash in hand. Drug approvals and company status change; check the NMPA’s current listings before acting on anything here.
The money: a record year, already beaten
The numbers need a careful reading, because the headline figure is not cash. Start with the scale, then with what it actually means.
Chinese biotech companies licensed out $135.7 billion worth of drug candidates to global pharmaceutical partners in 2025 — nearly triple the 2024 total. The first two months of 2026 delivered another $52 billion across 41 transactions, and the first quarter reached $60 billion. By mid-October 2026, the year-to-date total had passed $139 billion, beating the whole of 2025 with two and a half months still to run.
The first half of 2026 alone tells the story in miniature. Chinese innovators completed 81 out-licensing deals in the first half of 2026, spanning 10 therapeutic areas, with licensees across 20 countries and regions, at a potential total value of about $110 billion — according to figures published by China’s National Medical Products Administration and cited by the National Healthcare Security Administration. Total upfront payments in that half were roughly $5 billion — about 5% of the potential total. The $110 billion is the sum of the highest quantifiable potential contract values deal by deal; it excludes future sales royalties and it is not realized value. Most of it is milestones tied to clinical outcomes that may never arrive. The honest way to read the boom is: the pipeline is real, the upfront cash is a small fraction of the headline, and the bet is on future success.
That said, the direction is unmistakable, and the buyers are the biggest names in the industry. The 15 largest pharmaceutical companies by global revenue closed 23 deals with Chinese companies in the first half of 2026, with a potential total value of about $80 billion — less than 30% of the deal count, but more than 70% of the potential value. Big Pharma is not dabbling. It is buying the pipeline.
ING forecasts that by 2026 China will supply roughly one-third of new molecules in global pharma pipelines, compared with 4% in 2014, and expects Chinese out-licensing values to top $250 billion in 2026. A forecast is not a result — but the year-to-date $139 billion already makes the direction hard to dispute.
Where the money is going: three therapeutic areas, one new structure
Obesity and metabolic disease. The single largest deal of the year sits here. In January 2026, AstraZeneca’s alliance with CSPC Pharmaceutical Group set the record for a single China-originated deal at $18.5 billion — $1.2 billion upfront, $3.5 billion in R&D milestones, and $13.8 billion in sales milestones — covering eight programs, anchored in obesity. Novo Nordisk struck an exclusive license with Hengrui Pharma covering an early-stage oral GLP-1/GIP taken once weekly, with a total potential value of $2.6 billion. The weight-loss drug race is the most expensive in the industry, and China is now supplying a large share of its candidates.
Oncology. Cancer remains the deepest pool. Pfizer’s $6 billion oncology entrance with 3SBio and AbbVie’s $5.6 billion licensing deal with RemeGen — $650 million upfront, up to $4.95 billion in milestones, plus double-digit royalties, for a bispecific antibody — are the headline oncology transactions of the year. GSK’s $12.5 billion alliance with Hengrui Pharma spans multiple programs. Oncology dominates because it is where China’s innovation is most concentrated: the country’s drug regulator approved 48 first-in-class innovative drugs in 2024, the most in five years, and oncology led the list. For how that approval system works, see our China Biotech and Healthcare: A Deep Dive.
Autoimmune and the new deal structure. In October 2026, Novartis agreed to pay $575 million upfront for global rights to Abogen’s mRNA therapy, with up to $7.2 billion in milestones and an exclusive option over other RNA platform assets — a deal whose total value approaches $8 billion. The interesting part is not the size but the shape. Chinese innovators are increasingly using the “NewCo” model: instead of licensing a molecule outright, the Chinese company takes a stake in a freshly formed overseas company built around the asset. Hansoh Pharmaceutical licensed its IL-23 receptor antagonist to Avere Therapeutics in June 2026 in a deal worth more than $2.3 billion — Hansoh’s first NewCo structure — and Hengrui adopted the same model for its HRS-1893 program. The NewCo lets the Chinese innovator keep upside and a seat at the table, instead of selling the molecule and watching from the sidelines.
Why is Big Pharma buying so aggressively? The simplest answer is the patent cliff. Between 2026 and 2030, patent expirations will strip roughly $200 billion in annual revenue from the global pharmaceutical industry. Western R&D costs run $2–3 billion per approved drug, with timelines stretching past a decade. China supplies new molecules at a lower discovery cost, thanks to a mature research and manufacturing supply chain — and after a decade of reform, the clinical data is now trusted enough for global buyers to pay for it. That trust is the real story of the decade: long gone are the days when Big Pharma scoffed at the reliability of China’s clinical trials, as Reuters put it in October 2026.
The friction: BIOSECURE is law, but the restrictions are not yet in force
The counterweight to the boom is Washington, and the most important fact about it is the timeline. The BIOSECURE Act is law. Its restrictions are not yet in effect. The gap between those two facts is where the industry is operating right now.
After failing to pass in the previous Congress, a revised version of the BIOSECURE Act was signed into law by President Trump on December 18, 2025, as Section 851 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60). The law restricts US federal agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of federal grants and loans from procuring or using biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by “biotechnology companies of concern.” Unlike the 2024 bill, which specifically named WuXi AppTec, WuXi Biologics, BGI, MGI, and Complete Genomics, the enacted law names no company. Instead, the Office of Management and Budget must publish a list of designated companies — no later than one year after enactment, by December 18, 2026 — based on suggestions from the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Attorney General and other agencies.
The implementation then runs in phases, and the phases are slow. OMB must issue implementing guidance within 180 days after the list is published; the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council must then revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation within a year after the guidance; and the prohibitions take effect 60 or 90 days after the FAR is revised — expected around mid-2028. Contracts entered into before the effective date are grandfathered for five years, except for companies named on the Defense Department’s 1260H list as of December 18, 2025. The Defense Department updated that 1260H list on June 8, 2026, adding several biotechnology and genomics firms.
Three things the law does not do are as important as what it does. It does not ban private commercial trade: a Western drugmaker licensing a molecule from a Chinese biotech is not a federal procurement, and the Act does not touch it. It does not name any company — the list is still to come, and its contents will decide how much of the industry is actually affected. And it does not take effect immediately: as of November 2026, the official list is still due, and the rules apply only after the FAR is revised. That is why the licensing boom and the law can coexist for now — and why the OMB list, due by December 18, 2026, is the single most important date on the industry’s calendar.
The friction is not limited to BIOSECURE. The same month the Act became law, the broader US–China technology contest was tightening around the inputs biotech depends on — and the tariff layers on Chinese goods, including the Section 301 duties, already shape the cost of everything that crosses the Pacific. For the tariff side of that friction, see Section 301 Tariffs on China, Explained: Lists, Rates, and the New 12.5% Duty and the U.S.-China Trade War Hub.
The paradox, stated plainly
Here is the tension in one paragraph. Western drugmakers need Chinese molecules because their own pipelines cannot fill a $200 billion patent cliff, and they are paying record prices for them — $139 billion in licensing value in ten months. At the same time, Washington is building a legal framework to cut federal money off from Chinese biotech services, on national-security grounds, with the first list of designated companies due within weeks. The two trends are not contradictory; they are aimed at different things. The licensing boom is about molecules — intellectual property, discovered in China, developed globally. The restrictions are about services and equipment — who does the lab work, whose machines run the sequencing, whose data flows where. A molecule licensed to a Western pharma company is not the same as a federal contract with a Chinese service provider, and the law treats them differently. But the boundary is political, not technical, and it will move. The companies that survive it will be the ones that read the OMB list when it lands, check which of their counterparties are on it, and structure their deals — NewCo or otherwise — so that the science and the services sit on different sides of the line.
For the wider technology picture these deals sit inside — fintech, 5G, AI, and the rest of China’s innovation system — see the Chinese Technology and Innovation: The Complete Guide.
FAQ
How much money is actually flowing into Chinese biotech?
In potential deal value, a record: just over $139 billion in out-licensing agreements in the year to mid-October 2026, already beating the full-year 2025 record of $135.7 billion. In cash, far less: upfront payments in the first half of 2026 were roughly $5 billion, about 5% of the $110 billion potential total for that half. The rest is milestones and royalties that depend on the drugs succeeding.
What is the BIOSECURE Act, and is it in force?
It is a US law, enacted December 18, 2025, that will restrict federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients from buying biotechnology equipment or services from designated “biotechnology companies of concern.” It is not yet in force: the list of companies is due from the Office of Management and Budget by December 18, 2026, and the prohibitions apply only after the Federal Acquisition Regulation is revised, expected around mid-2028. It does not ban private commercial licensing deals.
Does BIOSECURE name WuXi AppTec or BGI?
No. The 2024 bill named WuXi AppTec, WuXi Biologics, BGI, MGI, and Complete Genomics, but that bill was never enacted. The version that became law names no company; the OMB list will decide who is designated.
What is a NewCo deal?
A structure in which the Chinese licensor, instead of licensing a molecule outright, takes a stake in a freshly formed overseas company built around the asset. Hansoh Pharmaceutical and Hengrui have both used it in 2026. It lets the Chinese innovator keep upside and a seat at the table rather than selling the molecule and stepping away.
Why is Big Pharma buying Chinese molecules now?
Because of the patent cliff: roughly $200 billion in annual revenue will be lost to patent expirations between 2026 and 2030, and Western R&D costs $2–3 billion per approved drug. China now supplies about a third of new molecules in global pipelines, at a lower discovery cost, with clinical data global buyers trust. The science got good, and the pipeline gap got urgent, at the same time.
Sources and check dates
- Reuters Breakingviews, “China biotech’s ingenuity extends to dealmaking,” October 16, 2026 (out-licensing just over $139 billion year-to-date, PharmCube data; average agreement nearly $700 million, more than 10 times the 2018 figure; Novartis–Abogen $575 million upfront, up to $7.2 billion in milestones) — checked 2026-11-19. https://www.breakingviews.com/40925ca4af2b/columns/considered-view/china-biotechs-ingenuity-extends-dealmaking-2026-10-16/
- 2025 out-licensing total $135.7 billion; Q1 2026 $60 billion; first two months 2026 $52 billion across 41 transactions — Vision Life Sciences tracker and industry tallies as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- First-half 2026: 81 deals, about $110 billion potential total, about $5 billion upfronts; top 15 multinationals: 23 deals, about $80 billion — NMPA/NHSA-cited figures as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- AstraZeneca–CSPC $18.5 billion (January 2026); GSK–Hengrui $12.5 billion; AbbVie–RemeGen $5.6 billion ($650 million upfront); Pfizer–3SBio $6 billion; Novo Nordisk–Hengrui oral GLP-1/GIP $2.6 billion — as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- ING forecast: China about one-third of new molecules in global pipelines by 2026 (vs 4% in 2014); out-licensing to top $250 billion in 2026 — as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- Hansoh–Avere NewCo (June 2026, over $2.3 billion); Hengrui HRS-1893 NewCo model — as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- Patent cliff about $200 billion in annual revenue, 2026–2030; Western R&D $2–3 billion per approved drug — as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- BIOSECURE Act enacted December 18, 2025, as Section 851 of the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60); no companies named; OMB list due by December 18, 2026; guidance within 180 days after the list; FAR revision within a year after guidance; prohibitions 60/90 days after FAR revision (expected around mid-2028); five-year grandfathering except 1260H-listed companies as of December 18, 2025 — Baker McKenzie, “United States: The BIOSECURE Act Becomes Law,” and Ropes & Gray via JD Supra, checked 2026-11-19. https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2026/01/united-states-the-biosecure-act-becomes-law
- DoD 1260H list updated June 8, 2026, adding biotechnology and genomics firms — as reported, checked 2026-11-19.
- NMPA 2024: 48 first-in-class innovative drugs, most in five years — via the site’s own deep dive, “China Biotech and Healthcare: A Deep Dive,” checked 2026-11-19.
- Featured image: a researcher uses a pipette to remove DNA from a micro test tube, National Human Genome Research Institute (public domain, via Wikimedia Commons). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NHGRI_researcher_uses_a_pipette_to_remove_DNA_from_a_micro_test_tube.jpg
All sources checked November 19, 2026. Deal values are potential totals as reported on that date; the OMB list of biotechnology companies of concern is due by December 18, 2026, after this article’s publication date.
