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Quick Answer
On October 9, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued Announcement No. 61 of 2025, and buried inside a rare-earth export-control notice is a clause the whole semiconductor industry watches: a case-by-case licensing review for any export whose end use involves developing or making logic chips at 14 nanometers or below, memory chips with 256 layers or more, the equipment and materials to make them, or artificial intelligence with potential military applications.
It is a review, not a ban — and that distinction is the whole story. License applications for foreign military end-users and for entities on China’s export-control lists are refused in principle. Applications touching advanced chips or military AI are reviewed case by case, which means they can be approved, delayed, or denied one at a time, with no published timeline. The announcement text suspends No. 61 as a whole by number — MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs (GACC) extended the suspension of the six October 2025 announcements, including No. 61, from November 11, 2026 to January 10, 2027 — but whether the chip/AI review is treated as suspended in practice has not been confirmed by any source checked, so this article does not state it as suspended or as active. What the text says, and what remains unverified, are kept separate below.
The rare-earth side of the same package — the element lists, the 0.1% rule for foreign-made goods, the two suspension notices, and the separate controls that were never paused — is covered in full in our companion article, China’s Rare Earth Export Controls, Explained: The Two Tracks and the January 10, 2027 Date. This article is about the chip track only.
This article explains China’s semiconductor export controls as of November 21, 2026. It is not legal, customs, or investment advice. Announcement numbers, dates, and thresholds are as reported on that date; the controls change, and January 10, 2027 is the next recheck point — verify against the current MOFCOM text before acting on anything here.
What the chip clause actually says
Announcement No. 61 is formally a notice about rare-earth items made abroad. Its headline provision — the one that made the news — is the extraterritorial rule: foreign-made products containing Chinese-origin rare earth items worth 0.1 percent or more of their value need a Chinese export license. But the notice contains a second, separate provision, and it has nothing to do with the value of rare earths in a shipment.
Under Announcement No. 61, export license applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis for end uses involving: (1) developing and fabricating logic semiconductors using an “advanced process” of 14-nanometer node or below, and memories with 256 layers or more; (2) producing semiconductor manufacturing or testing equipment, as well as raw materials used for those semiconductors; and (3) developing artificial intelligence with potential military end-use. The provision is Article 4 of the announcement, as identified in the Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) English translation of the MOFCOM text. The same announcement restates the denial principle for license requests for exports to foreign military end-users and to entities on the controlled list and watch list.
Read it slowly, because the wording is doing three things at once. First, it names the thresholds — 14 nanometers and 256 layers — that decide whether an end use falls inside the review. Second, it reaches beyond finished chips to the equipment and materials used to make them, so a shipment of lithography-adjacent tools or wafer chemicals can be caught even if no chip is in the box. Third, it reaches beyond hardware into AI development itself, wherever that development has potential military use. A license application is not judged on what the item is. It is judged on what the buyer will do with it.
For the tariff side of the same US-China friction, see Section 301 Tariffs on China, Explained: Lists, Rates, and the New 12.5% Duty.
Why 14 nanometers and 256 layers
The two numbers are not random, and they are not new. They are the same lines the United States drew in its own semiconductor controls — which is precisely why they matter.
The phrasing mirrors the language the US Commerce Department used when Washington set its own semiconductor export thresholds: 14/16 nanometers for logic, 18 nanometers for DRAM, and 128 layers for NAND, under rules aimed at preventing Chinese access to military-use AI hardware. China’s version sets the memory line higher, at 256 layers rather than 128, and states the logic line flatly at 14 nanometers and below. The thresholds are not identical to the American ones, but they are drawn from the same map: the point at which a chip stops being a commodity and starts being a strategic input.
That mirroring is the point. China is not copying the American rules; it is building a mirror-image review posture, so that any item touching advanced chips or military AI can be held for individual review. The United States uses its thresholds to keep advanced chips out of China. China uses its thresholds to keep the materials and tools that make advanced chips — including the rare earths inside them — under its own licensing review. Each side now has a lever on the other’s supply chain, and the 14-nanometer line is where the two levers meet.
It also explains why the clause reaches back to older technology. 14-nanometer logic and 256-layer memory are not the bleeding edge — leading foundries are several generations ahead — but they cover the workhorse nodes used in cars, industrial equipment, telecom gear, and much of the AI inference hardware now being deployed. A control set at 3 nanometers would touch a handful of fabs. A control set at 14 nanometers touches nearly the whole industry.
A review is not a ban — and that is the problem
The most misunderstood sentence in the whole package is the one that says applications “will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.” It sounds mild. It is not.
Announcement No. 61 draws a sharp line between two treatments. Applications for exports to foreign military end-users, and to entities on China’s export control entity list or watch list — including their branches and subsidiaries where the listed entities own 50 percent or more — face presumptive denial. Applications touching advanced chips or military AI face case-by-case review. The first is a door that is closed. The second is a door with no published answer, no published timeline, and no published criteria for what gets through.
For a company planning a shipment, the second treatment can be worse than the first. A denial is a decision you can plan around. A case-by-case review is an open question: the license might be granted, it might be granted slowly, or it might be held indefinitely while a negotiation plays out elsewhere. That uncertainty is the mechanism. The review posture gives Beijing a say over materials headed for the same advanced-chip industry that American controls target, without having to issue a single ban — and every license decision becomes a data point in the wider US-China negotiation.
One more distinction matters. The chip clause is an end-use review, not an item ban. Nothing in it says 14-nanometer chips themselves cannot be exported. What it says is that exports of listed rare-earth items — the magnets, targets, and materials inside No. 61’s appendices — get individual scrutiny when their end use touches advanced chips or military AI. A shipment of magnets to a car-parts factory and the same magnets to a fab making 14-nanometer logic are, under this text, different applications with different fates.
Who it touches
If the review ever switches on, the exposure is not evenly spread. Three groups sit closest to it.
Foundries and chipmakers. The new rules require case-by-case reviews for semiconductors and AI, and trade press reporting at the time singled out TSMC, Samsung, and other foundries: chipmakers use rare-earth chemicals in wafer fabrication, and analysts cited by the Commercial Times expected restricted materials to become scarcer and more expensive, with longer delivery times for equipment and components. The South China Morning Post reported, via TrendForce, that TSMC still relies on China for roughly 30 percent of the consumables used in its 7-nanometer-and-below chip production — a single secondary report, not independently verified here, and flagged as such in the unverified list below.
Memory and storage. The 256-layer line goes directly at the memory industry: NAND flash makers crossing that layer count, and hard-drive makers whose voice-coil actuators and spindle motors depend on specialized magnets that need heavy rare earths to hold their strength at high temperatures. TrendForce noted the controls could directly affect hard-drive production at Seagate and Western Digital.
Equipment makers. Semiconductor equipment makers are exposed twice: they rely on Chinese-origin rare earths for key components, and their own products — the tools that make 14-nanometer-and-below chips — are themselves named in the review clause. Bloomberg reported at the time that ASML, which effectively monopolizes advanced lithography systems, could face shipment delays of several weeks; the Commercial Times added that ASML was already preparing for supply disruptions.
The EV supply chain that sits downstream of the same materials — and the same pause — is covered in China’s EV Supply Chain: Batteries, Rare Earths, and the Tariff Response.
The suspension question: what the text says, and what it does not
Here is where this article is careful, because the sources are careful — and because one widely repeated summary goes further than the announcement text does.
On November 7, 2025, MOFCOM and GACC issued Announcement No. 70, suspending the six October 2025 announcements until November 10, 2026. On November 9, 2026 — one day before that suspension was due to lapse — MOFCOM and GACC issued Announcement No. 58 of 2026, continuing the suspension of the same six announcements, including No. 61, from November 11, 2026 to January 10, 2027. The extension is one sentence long, and it suspends the announcements by number. It does not carve out individual articles, and it does not mention the chip clause at all.
That is what the text says. What it does not say is how MOFCOM treats the chip/AI case-by-case review in practice while the suspension runs. One analyst guide reads the suspension as covering the chip clause along with the rest of No. 61, since the clause sits inside the suspended notice. That reading is plausible, and it is noted here — but no source checked confirms that license applications touching advanced chips are actually being processed, or not processed, as suspended, and no MOFCOM statement on the point has been found. So this article does not state the chip review as suspended, and does not state it as active. The practice question is listed as unverified below, and it stays that way until a source confirms it.
The timeline around the suspension is worth keeping straight, because the chip clause’s effective dates were never simple. Parts 1(1) and 1(2) of No. 61 — the 0.1% rule and the foreign-technology rule — were planned to take effect December 1, 2025, and did not take effect. Part 1(3), on Chinese-origin items, and Announcement No. 62 on technology took effect on publication, October 9, 2025, so No. 62 and part of No. 61 applied for about four weeks before the November 7 suspension. The four joint notices (Nos. 55–58 of 2025) were to take effect November 8, 2025, and never did. As of November 21, 2026, none of the six announcements applies.
Two related dates sit outside this article’s track but next to it. The April 2025 licensing regime for seven heavy rare earths — samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium — was never part of the suspension and remains in force; it is covered in the companion rare-earth article. Announcement No. 72 of 2025 suspends China’s presumption of refusal for US-bound gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials until November 27, 2026, and Announcement No. 58 of 2026 does not mention it — that date arrives before January 10, and it is the first test of whether the truce holds.
For the wider trade picture these controls sit inside, see the U.S.-China Trade War Hub.
What happens on January 10, 2027
The January deadline applies to specified temporary measures, not to the whole bilateral relationship. Three outcomes are possible, and they are offered as analysis, not forecast.
Renewal. A further dated pause, extending relief without changing its character. This is what happened on November 9, and it is the pattern of the last year: two-month extensions, each announced just before the deadline.
Modification. A negotiated schedule of licenses or volumes, which would improve operational access rather than just delaying the cliff. This is the only outcome that changes the facts on the ground for buyers — and the only one in which the chip clause’s case-by-case review would get tested in practice, application by application.
Lapse. The six measures resume, and the chip/AI review switches on with them. For manufacturers that buy Chinese magnets, battery materials, and chipmaking inputs, this is the outcome the November extension was bought to avoid — for two months. On the American side, the same date is the mirror deadline: USTR extended all 178 Section 301 exclusions to 11:59 p.m. eastern time on January 9, 2027, and formally extended the suspension of its maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding Section 301 measures until January 10, 2027. Unless the two sides agree on something longer, both sides’ suspensions run out on January 10.
Until then, the practical advice is boring and therefore correct: map which of your products touch 14-nanometer-and-below logic or 256-layer-and-above memory, map which of your inputs contain Chinese-origin rare earths or were made with Chinese rare-earth technology, and do not assume a pause is a repeal — or that a review is a ban.
FAQ
What exactly is the chip clause in China’s export controls?
It is Article 4 of MOFCOM Announcement No. 61 of 2025 (October 9, 2025). It says export license applications are reviewed case by case when the end use involves developing or making logic chips at 14 nanometers or below, memory with 256 layers or more, the equipment and materials to make those chips, or AI with potential military applications. It sits inside a notice that is formally about rare-earth items made abroad.
Is the chip review a ban on exporting chips to China?
No. It is an end-use review, not an item ban. Nothing in it prohibits exporting 14-nanometer chips. It says that exports of listed rare-earth items get individual scrutiny when their end use touches advanced chips or military AI. Applications for foreign military end-users and listed entities face presumptive denial; advanced-chip and military-AI applications face case-by-case review, which can end in approval, delay, or denial.
Why 14 nanometers and 256 layers?
They are the thresholds the United States uses in its own semiconductor controls — 14/16 nanometers for logic, 18 nanometers for DRAM, 128 layers for NAND — adapted by China, with the memory line set higher at 256 layers. The numbers mark the point where a chip stops being a commodity and becomes a strategic input, and they cover the workhorse nodes used in cars, telecom gear, and AI hardware, not just the bleeding edge.
Is the chip review currently suspended?
The announcement text suspends Announcement No. 61 as a whole by number, from November 11, 2026 to January 10, 2027, and the chip clause sits inside No. 61. But whether MOFCOM treats the case-by-case review as suspended in practice has not been confirmed by any source checked as of November 21, 2026. This article does not state it as suspended or as active; the question is listed as unverified.
What happens on January 10, 2027?
The suspension lapses unless it is extended again. The realistic outcomes are renewal (another dated pause), modification (a negotiated licensing or volume schedule), or lapse (the six October 2025 measures resume, including the chip/AI review, and the US Section 301 exclusions end). The Ministry has not said which it will be. The November 27, 2026 gallium/germanium/antimony date arrives first and is the first test of whether the truce holds.
Sources and check dates
- MOFCOM Announcement No. 61 of 2025 (October 9, 2025) — case-by-case review for end uses involving 14nm-and-below logic chips, 256-layer-or-more memory, semiconductor manufacturing/testing equipment and raw materials, and AI with potential military end-use; presumptive denial for military end-users and listed/watch-listed entities (50% rule) — as reported by Lexology, “China Introduces New Rules of Export Control on Rare Earth and Semiconductor Items,” and by Jones Day, “China Imposes Extraterritorial Export Control Measures Over Rare Earth Items” (October 28, 2025), checked 2026-11-21. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fbe6e7bd-347d-4ef3-9055-e6222e09eb82
- SpecialElement, “MOFCOM’s October 2025 measures and their suspension” — six announcements (Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62 of 2025); No. 61 scope and Article 4 chip/AI case-by-case review; Announcement No. 70 suspension (November 7, 2025) and Announcement No. 58 of 2026 extension (November 9, 2026) from November 11, 2026 to January 10, 2027; effective dates (parts 1(1) and 1(2) planned December 1, 2025, did not take effect; No. 62 and part 1(3) effective October 9, 2025); April 2025 seven-element regime never suspended — checked 2026-11-21. https://specialelement.com/learn/policy/mofcom-october-2025-measures
- Mayer Brown, “PRC Announces New Export Controls on Rare Earth and Battery Materials and Technology” (October 2025) — six proclamations; chip/AI end-use review posture; battery controls effective November 8, 2025; extraterritorial controls December 1, 2025 — checked 2026-11-21. https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/pdf/insights/publications/2025/10/prc-announces-new-export-controls-on-rare-earth-and-battery-materials-and-technology
- Tom’s Hardware, “China’s new rare-earth curbs target chipmaking industry in retaliation to US restrictions” — 14nm-and-below logic and 256-layer-and-above memory thresholds; US thresholds (14/16nm logic, 18nm DRAM, 128-layer NAND) as the mirrored language — checked 2026-11-21. https://www.tomshardware.com/chinas-new-rare-earth-curbs-hit-14nm-and-256-layer-chipmaking
- TrendForce, “China’s Toughest Rare-Earth Rules Hit Global Chip Supply: TSMC, ASML, Samsung on Alert” (October 13, 2025) — foundry, memory, and equipment exposure; TSMC ~30% of consumables for 7nm-and-below from China (via SCMP, single secondary report); ASML shipment-delay risk (via Bloomberg); Seagate/Western Digital HDD exposure — checked 2026-11-21. https://www.trendforce.com/news/2025/10/13/news-chinas-toughest-rare-earth-rules-hit-global-chip-supply-tsmc-asml-samsung-on-alert/
- Reuters (via The Edge), “China Tightens Rare Earth Export Controls, Targets Defence, Semiconductor Users” (October 10, 2025) — overseas defence users will not be granted licences; advanced-semiconductor applications approved only case by case; extraterritorial rules from December 1, 2025 — checked 2026-11-21. https://klse.i3investor.com/web/blog/detail/ceomorningbrief/2025-10-10-story-h500440289-China_Tightens_Rare_Earth_Export_Controls_Targets_Defence_Semiconductor_
- Daily Cortex, “China Keeps New Rare-Earth Curbs Paused Until Jan. 10” — Announcement No. 58 of 2026 is one sentence long, suspending the six 2025 announcements from November 11, 2026 to January 10, 2027; No. 61 chip clause sends applications for 14nm-or-less logic, 256-layer-or-more memory, related equipment and materials, and military-potential AI to case-by-case review; Washington’s affiliates rule also runs out January 10, 2027 — checked 2026-11-21. https://www.dailycortex.com/china-extends-its-truce-to-jan-10
- CarraGlobe, “China Rare Earth Export Controls 2026: The 0.1% Rule Returns November 10” — Article 4 case-by-case review for advanced chips and AI, per the Georgetown CSET English translation of MOFCOM Announcement No. 61; notes the clause sits inside No. 61 and reads it as suspended with the notice — checked 2026-11-21. https://carraglobe.com/china-rare-earth-export-controls-2026/
- Companion article on this site: “China’s Rare Earth Export Controls, Explained: The Two Tracks and the January 10, 2027 Date” (C9) — the October 2025 package overview, the rare-earth track, the November 9, 2026 extension, the April 2025 seven-element regime, Announcement No. 72 of 2025 (gallium/germanium/antimony until November 27, 2026), and the three January 10 outcomes — checked 2026-11-21. https://hechuanjie.com/china-rare-earth-export-controls-explained-two-tracks/
- Featured image: close-up of a microchip on an electronic circuit board. Photo: Alexandra Krainyukhova, Pexels (Pexels License). https://www.pexels.com/photo/close-up-of-microcircuit-6842695/
All sources checked November 21, 2026. Announcement numbers, dates, and thresholds are as reported on that date. Recheck before January 10, 2027, and again before November 27, 2026 for the gallium/germanium/antimony suspension.


